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AFTER HIS KIND:
THE BIOLOGICAL UNIT OF CREATION
Lane P. Lester Raymond G. Bohlin
Director Research Projects Manager
Center for Creation Studies Probe Ministries, International
Liberty University Dallas, Texas
Lynchburg, Virginia
DESIGN IN NATURE
Design in nature has been a topic of debate for centuries. We have no intention of
trying to argue conclusively on a philosophic basis that it is intelligent design.
Rather, we hope to show briefly by example that the need for intelligence in bringing
about the various designs in nature is by no means a preposterous proposition. We
maintain that there are two recognizable yet intuitively distinct forms of design, that
which is easily explainable in terms of physical properties and processes and that which
requires intelligent ordering. Some contrasting examples will make the point. When a
water droplet freezes around a dust particle, an elaborately designed snowflake results,
simply due to physical properties. The same is true for the development of a crystal in
a supersaturated solution. Just let the solution cool and then tap it. Order suddenly
emerges as the crystal develops. In the American West, there are numerous examples of
natural sculpture. Chimneys, arches, bridges, human profiles, etc., all dutifully
sketched from the rock by the forces of wind and rain. But one would not confuse such
structures with Mt. Rushmore, or the Golden Gate Bridge, or the World Trade Center.
These human architectural artifacts show clearly the marks of intelligent design. The
sharp geometrical forms and the finely sculpted lines are recognized intuitively as the
works of human intelligence. The simple point is that intelligent design is discernably
different from natural design.
Carl Sagan uses the same reasoning In telling of the search for intelligent life on
Mars. Initially, the canals on Mars, as visible through telescopes, were thought to be
possible evidences of intelligent life. Because of the patterns involved, it was possible
the canals were engineered by intelligent beings. However, upon closer inspection, first
by space probes passing close by, and eventually by actually landing on Mars, the canals
faded into nothingness, superficial artifacts and nothing more. However, as one
approaches Earth, the conclusion is the opposite. From the distances of space there is
nothing about Earth's surface which betrays the presence of intelligence. There are
continents and seas with no observable patterns. But as one gets closer and sharpens the
focus, geometry is revealed in the forms of farms and fields, highways, streets, and
buildings. Suddenly the presence of intelligence is unmistakable.
With living things, the best of both perspectives is readily apparent. From a
distance, biological organisms are indeed marvelously adapted to their environments.
They slither, crawl, walk, run, fly, and some go nowhere at all. If we can be excused
for speaking anthropomorphicaily, there is beauty, humor, mystery, and drama. But what
happens upon closer scrutiny? Does the apparent design fade into nothingness? On the
contrary, it explodes into a maze of integrated complexity. Not only do geometrical
patterns reemerge in microscopic form as in the feather of a bird or the scales of a
butterfly wing, but at the molecular level, volumes are needed to express all that goes
on. Orchestrating the whole process is the genetic machinery operating through the ONA
blueprint. The mark of intelligence is unmistakable.
This brings us to the topic of Information theory. Though there will be more on this
later, suffice it to say at this time, that information codes, of which DNA is one,
require intelligent manipulation, not only to create the vocabulary, but also to set up
the rules of transmission. For our purposes, the analogy can follow this way. Suppose
you were walking down the beach or a river bank and, as one would expect, you observe
ripples in the sand. A perfect example of natural order due to the physical properties
of the sand and water and the movement of water in waves over the sand. Easily
explainable. But let us say you decide to walk further. Later, you come across the
words "JOHN LOVES MARY" written in the sand. We intuitively recognize this as
intelligent manipulation of matter to formulate coded information. In ONA there are
precise symbols or letters (nudeotides) grouped into words (codons). These words are
also arranged in a particular sequence to form sentences (genes) or complete thoughts.
To go further, sentences are strung together to form paragraphs (regulatory groups or
operons) and paragraphs are set in order to form chapters (chromosomes) and volumes
(genomes).
By simply applying some basic criteria to living systems, the evidence of intelligent
design is overwhelming, if not compelling. We believe that the application of
information theory to the field of genetics will yield a comprehensible theory of limited
biological change. We attempt here to present a model of limited biological change
constrained by the genetic machinery yet endowed with an impressive display of
variability and hence adaptability. This is essentially the creationist's concept of the
created kind. Various attempts have been made to suggest theories for delineating the
boundaries of a kind. Marsh's theory of gametic fusion states that only organisms within
a kind will produce a successful fusion of sperms and eggs with varying degrees of
success following zygote formation. But this approach is rather simplistic and offers no
rationale for why this is so. Another suggestion is based on behavioral similarities.
Two problems surface here. First, it will only apply to animals, and second, it still
does not deal with the mechanism. What causes these behaviors to be different? If there
is so much room for variation, how can the kinds retain their integrity? It is our
intention to propose a creationist model of limited biological change based on the
genetic structure of organisms.
GENETICS AND INFORMATION THEORY
In recent years, several authors have exposed the connection between the genetic code
of DNA and information theory. These studies, for the most part, have concerned
themselves specifically with the origins of the genetic code. The overwhelming
conclusion is that information does not and cannot arise spontaneously by mechanistic
processes. Intelligence is a necessity in the origin of an informational code, including
the genetic code, no matter how much time is given. The old analogy of sitting a monkey
at a typewriter, and given enough time, he would produce the complete works of
Shakespeare, is foolish. On a computer, William Bennett set one trillion monkeys to
typewriters, typing ten keys a second at random. We would have to wait a trillion times
the estimated age of the universe before we would even see the sentence, "To be, or not
to be: that is the question." It may be statistically possible for a pot of water to
freeze when placed on a stove burner, but the real probability is so absurd it is hardly
worth talking about. The same is true of monkeyi"~Eypewriting Shakespeare.
But that is not our problem. Our concern Is what happens after the code is in place.
Similar to language, there are two fundamental principles involved in the expression of
genetic information. First, there is a finite set of words which are the essentials of
content. In organisms, this is comparable to structural genes. Second, there are the
rules of grammar which provide for the richness of expression using the finite set of
words. In organisms, these rules or programs consist of the regulatory mechanisms. In
human language, given a finite set of words and a single set of rules, variety of
expression becomes virtually limitless. In fact, in information theory, the more
interesting question 1s not, "What does this message say?", but "Why was this expression
of a thought chosen over the countless others which could have done the job?" This
concept could provide the basis for a model of extensive variability based on slightly
different genes (aileies) within the same set of rules or regulatory mechanisms. The
power of recombination can take on a whole new meaning.
This could also provide the clue as to what mechanism preserves the integrity of a
created kind. It can be shown that what separates the higher taxonomic categories are
perhaps the regulatory mechanisms and not just structural genes. It is conceivable,
therefore, that the different kinds are characterized by slightly different regulatory
mechanisms, different programs. Certainly there are structural genes present in a mouse
which are not to be found in a bacterium; but these structural gene differences would
probably distinguish only major categories such as Phylum and Class. Structural gene
differences within the mammals may be much more subtle. We are not talking here about
mere amino acid sequence differences, but whole genes, structural information found in
one organism but not present in another. However, by a simple change of rules, wholly
new expressions are made possible, also rich in variety. The regulatory mechanisms would
both constrain and provide for variety simultaneously. The created kinds, therefore,
maintain their integrity in the face of a vast array of variation by virtue of their own
unique set of regulatory mechanisms.
On the other hand, one might say that if language is so powerful in its ability to
produce variety and novelty, couldn't mutation and natural selection change the rules of
regulatory mechanisms to produce biological novelty? The answer lies in the origin of
life question. Informational codes are constructed of vocabulary and grammar. Both, of
necessity, are produced only by intelligence. Random changes in letter and word
sequences ultimately can produce only gibberish. The same will result if one attempts to
change the rules.
According to evolution, the primary vehicle for the addition of new information is
gene duplication. Subsequent mutations to the new redundant gene then produce a new
gene. Since the new redundant gene is free from selection pressures, it can mutate
rather freely. Of course, most of these sequences would degenerate into gibberish, mere
genetic noise, but it is hoped that they will eventually mutate to a useful form.
This hope flies in the face of all that we know of the origin of informational codes.
Words do not descend to gibberish by random changes only to ascend back to a new meaning
by the same process. As biologists, we also wonder how the redundant gene slips out of
the selective process only to slip back In once the new meaningful gene is complete. Was
the copied gene no longer translated into protein while mutating? And if so, how was it
included back into the process later on?
The initial rules of genetic grammar did not arise by chance. Additional rules did
not result from random modifications of the existing rules. The information and programs
which distinguish the kinds have their origin in the intelligence of their Creator. With
structural genes, gene duplication only produces genes of similar function; nothing new
emerges. Duplication of regulatory genes can only arrive at the same end. This, we
believe, will be supported further by the advances and application of information theory
to the field of genetics.
Admittedly, this proposal at present Is highly theoretical. We offer it, not as a
final answer, but as potential framework for scientific investigation. Undoubtedly, there
will be the need for extensive refinements. After all, our understanding of regulatory
mechanisms is still on the ground floor. Indeed, some would say we haven't even finished
laying the foundation yet. But it is a start. We may even be wrong. But that is the
nature of science, and admittedly, as creationists, we have been far too timid to stick
our necks out. It is time to openly bring forth constructive ideas which will lead to
fruitful research. It is our sincere hope that this is one.
THE CREATED KIND: A DEFINITION
At the outset, many might complain that the concept of a created kind is not a
legitimate scientific pursuit because its origin is from the Bible. The word "kind" is a
biblical term from which we do not want to hide. However, many theories of science have
had their origin from stranger sources. Kekule gained his inspiration for the chemical
ring structure from a dream of a snake biting its tail. Tesla got the idea for the
alternating current motor from a vision while reading the poet Goethe. The point is that
one's source for an idea is irrelevant. The key is whether the theory is practical and
testable. If our theory of the created kind 1s to be rejected, let It be for a lack of
scientific integrity, and not that its inspiration is biblical.
To help alleviate any bias that may arise from the use of the phrase "created kind",
we have proposed the word "prototype" In its place. "Proto" being the Latin prefix
meaning "ancestral" and "type" deriving from the latin word meaning "image". This
provides a Latin base consistent with the rest of taxonomy while providing for the
essential meaning of an ancestral image or form upon which numerous variations are
possible.
It is admittedly not an easy task to submit a definition of a prototype which has
significant biological meaning. In taxonomy, this difficulty is not without precedent.
There is no universal agreement over what a species is, let alone whether there are two,
three, or five kingdoms. In evolutionary taxonomy, all organisms are said to be related
through descent. Therefore the species is the only category that has any objective
criteria, that of reproductive Isolation from other species. Unfortunately, one cannot
always determine whether two populations are reproductively isolated or not. There are
degrees of isolation which make even species designations tenuous. But, at least, in
many cases reproductive isolation is a testable entity. Not so for categories from Genus
on up to Kingdom. These distinctions are based primarily upon degrees of similarity and
dissimilarity. All objectivity soon vanishes. With the inclusion of prototype, a new.
frequently testable taxonomic category is introduced.
For taxonomic purposes, a prototype could be simply defined as "all organisms that are
descended from a single created population". This definition necessitates the making of
two distinctions. First, the prototype is not synonymous with species. To speak of the
fixity of species is outdated and Inaccurate. A prototype may consist of only one
species, or it may be comprised of dozens of species. Some groups, due to organismal and
ecological characteristics, speciate more readily than others. This concept would hold
true under the banner of prototypes as well. Secondly, the prototype cannot be
universally associated with any particular taxonomic level. Evolutionists who demand
identification of the created kind with some particular taxon betray their own ignorance
of the subjectivity of higher taxonomic levels. In some groups, it may turn out to be
synonymous with family, and in others, with genera or even species. The prototype is a
discrete objective unit; therefore, it will not be useful to attempt broad identification
with any one taxonomic unit across the board.
This makes the identification of the prototype more difficult. This may prove to be a
monumental task for creationary biologists. The identification of the prototypes becomes
a process of reevaluation according to traditional and non-traditional methods:
1. Morphology. The structure or appearance of organisms has been the predominant
method of distinguishing taxonomic categories since Linnaeus, the father of taxonomy.
This would still make a useful initial step. A woodpecker is not an ostrich, and a rose
is not a dandelion. The current taxonomic levels of Kingdom, Phylum, and Class would
still be most helpful at this point.
2. Embryology. Where this may prove helpful is in beginning to determine the role of
regulatory mechanisms in embryonic development. This could also be carried over into
post-natal devleopment. Fundamental differences here may lead to distinguishing
characters in terms of the regulatory structure.
3. Chromosome morphology. Since differences in gross chromosome morphology usually
are the cause of hybrid sterility, it follows that chromosome morphology may help in
identifying members of a particular prototype, as well as excluding others. It is
interesting to note that in 1977, a standardized chromosome set was proposed for the
North American deer mouse (Peromyscus) which Includes more than 50 species. With all of
the species studied, the consistent element is chromosome number (2n=48). Among the
various species, considerable variation is seen in the way the chromosomes are organized,
but it seems obvious that these are all related species within one prototype. The next
step would be to compare chromosome morphology with other genera with similar organismal
morphologies, such as the house mouse (Mus).
4. Structural genes. This would not only involve amino acid sequence differences of
protein, such as cytochrome C which is common to most organisms, but also delineation of
proteins unique to certain groups. This is one area about which we know very little at
present, but which holds a great deal of potential, if we are applying information theory
correctly.
5. Regulatory mechanisms. This is undoubtedly the critical area of investigation of
the future. We know so little about It. We have a fairly good concept of the
relationship between a single structural gene and its protein product. Our knowledge of
the relationship between the gene and the organism as a whole is virtually nil.
Much of this mystery undoubtedly is caught up In the regulatory mechanisms.
6. A host of other biological facts could also serve as additional criteria. These
would include behavior, physiology, reproductive patterns, and success or failure of
garnetic fusion. In short, in many cases it will require a very extensive knowledge of
the organism to make the identification. At times various levels of data may seem to
conflict. An illustrative example is that of humans and the great apes. Anatomically
and behaviorally, man is quite distinct from the orangutan, gorilla, and chimpanzee.
However, genie and highly detailed chromosome studies show an unexpectedly high degree of
similarity.
To summarize our concept of the prototype, let us emphasize that a host of biological
techniques may be applicable in identifying the members of a kind, as well as
distinguishing between the prototypes. No one criterion such as chromosome morphology,
behavior, garnetic fusion, etc. will be definitive in all cases. At times, a single test
may be sufficient; at others, a multiplicity of approaches will be necessary. However,
in terms of the mechanism of limited variation, the application of information theory to
the genetic machinery should prove the most promising. The crucial factor will be
delineation of the necessity of intelligent design in the structuring of the
informational content and grammar of the genome of each prototype. This will indicate
not only the necessity of intelligence in originating the genetic code in the broad
universal sense, but also in the specific sense of the unique adaptive programs of each
prototype. But just as a word of caution, it is necessary to point out that although the
prototype has an objective reality, we may only be able to hypothesize about a particular
organism's inclusion in a prototype. The taxonomic ambiguity of the giant panda would be
a problem for the creationist as well as the evolutionist.
